Milo vs. Salanga

By: Krissy Tullo

On Arbitrary Detention, Article 124 of the RPC

G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987

FACTS

An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent (accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.

Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

HELD

Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

Morales vs. Subido

By: Robert D. Mina

GR No. 1-29658

27 February 1969

FACTS

In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill No. 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance. The provision of the substitute bill reads:

“No person may be appointed chief of the city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain or higher.”

The petitioner asserted that there were various changes made in House Bill 6951 and according to the Petitioner the House bill division deleted an entire provision and substituted what is now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which section reads:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served as chief of police with exemplary record or has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/higher.

Petitioner even submitted documents that would appear that the omission of the phrase “who served the police department of a city” was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading stage and that the change was not made by Congress but only by an employee.

It is for this reason that the Petitioner would have the court look searchingly into the matter.

ISSUE

Whether the Judiciary can assail the validity of an enrolled bill by investigating the legislative process.

RULING

Negative, the Judiciary cannot be a “sleuth” trying to determine what actually happen in the process of lawmaking without  jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstone of our democratic system. The investigation which the Petitioner would like the Court to make can be better done in Congress.

The enrolled bill prevails in any discrepancy.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

By: Dennis D. San Diego

G.R. No. 115455

235 SCRA 630 (1994)

FACTS

RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI,  Section  26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

HELD

No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

Homeowners’ Association of the Phils., Inc. vs. The Municipal Board of Manila, et al. and Villegas

By: John Willie Alferos

G.R. No. L-23979          

August 30, 1968

FACTS

The Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 on December 31, 1963, to take effect on January 1, 1964, declaring a state of emergency in view of the prevailing scarcity of lands and buildings for residential purposes in the City of Manila which shall provide housing accommodations especially for the poor at reasonable rates. An action was brought by the Homeowners’ Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President, Vicente A. Rufino against the Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to nullify the aforementioned Municipal Ordinance.

ISSUE

Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is constitutional?

HELD

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring said ordinance “ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio upon the ground that the power to “declare a state of emergency … exclusively pertains to Congress”; that “there is no longer any state of emergency” which may justify the regulation of house rentals; that said ordinance disconstitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property owners”; that the power of the City of Manila to “regulate the business of … letting or subletting of lands and buildings” does not include the authority to prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City Charter.

Aglipay v. Ruiz

By: Mark Antonio A. Estallo 

GR 45459,  (64 Phil 201)

13 March 1937

FACTS

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

HELD

Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map
of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads
“Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Endencia vs. David

By: Gayle Angeli Recto

G.R. No. L-6355-56            

August 31, 1953

FACTS

Collector of Internal Revenue Saturnino David ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s compensation pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which states that “SEC. 13.   No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According to Solicitor General Juan R. Liwanag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, “our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. The Solicitor General also reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE

Whether Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional or not.

HELD

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

                                                                               

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

267 SCRA 402
3 February 1997 En Banc

By: Marge: Margarita M. Gutierrez

Alternative title: manila prince hotel petitioner vs. government service insurance system, manila hotel corporation, committee on privatization and office of the government corporate counsel

FACTS

The Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the former’s bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s check.

The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution “Filipino first policy” and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

 ISSUE

Whether or not the provisions of Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing or non self executing

If self executing: the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy (Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution) and is therefore null and void.

HELD

As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled that the qualified Filipino entity must be given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the provision. The Supreme Court, therefore, directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self executing rather than non self executing.  Such is the case with Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “in grant of rights and privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipino”.  According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term patrimony pertains to heritage . the constitution speaks of national patrimony , it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the constitution could have very well used the term natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos and therefore an example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage

The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners, and this is not to be taken lightly as Nationalism is inherent in the concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.